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Central and Late Medieval Europe 
 
Len Scales 
 
The wicked shall be turned into hell, and all the nations that forget God (Psalm 9:17) 
 
NEW ORDER: GENOCIDAL FANTASIES, EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATIONS 
For some, genocide is Europe’s peculiar gift to the world. Others insist that, far from being 
atavistic, genocide is a crime of – as well as against – civilisation.1 Where, then, to place 
those centuries – between, approximately, the years 1000 and 1500 – in which, if some very 
distinguished medieval historians are to be believed, European civilisation itself was formed? 
On the whole, sunny vistas still prevail here – especially on that formative period between the 
eleventh and thirteenth centuries which is sometimes called the ‘high’ Middle Ages. Here was 
a Europe of cathedrals and universities, of mind and spirit, in which the peaceful arts 
prospered in growing towns, new orders of monks sought a foretaste of heaven on earth, and 
the values of chivalry began to soften the violence of the dark-age warlord. ‘Humanism’ 
found a home already in the twelfth no less than the fifteenth century. A ‘Europe of 
sensibility’ was being born, which ‘brooked no internal boundaries’.2 Where to look for the 
dark side? Was there, from the present volume’s perspective, a ‘dark side’ at all? The history 
of genocidal thought and action in medieval Europe remains unwritten. Perhaps that is 
because there is none to write. 
 There is indeed a history to recount, and the formation of European literate culture, or 
civilisation, must be given a central part in it. So, too, however, must the developing 
structures of power upon which civilisations rest; and the history of power in medieval 
Europe is one of new divisions as well as emergent unities. An eleventh-century illustrated 
gospel book, now in the Pierpont Morgan Library in New York, shows Christ cleansing the 
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Temple with a whip.
3
 It might stand as emblematic for much of what was to follow in the 
period – and what follows in these pages. The book was made for Countess Matilda of 
Tuscany, close ally of Pope Gregory VII (1073-1085), whose radical vision of a society 
transformed under papal headship did so much to set Latin Europe on new foundations. The 
image signals some salient characteristics of the dawning era: a preoccupation with purity and 
a mission to purge the impure; a new decisiveness in setting boundaries and ruling both in and 
out; a growing facility in discrimination – understood both as discernment and disfavour; a 
quest for perfectible Christian communities; and a willingness to seek these ends by force. In 
each of these developments, culture and power were bound up together. They were elements 
in a ‘Europe of sensibility’ that induced its inhabitants to build up, not tear down, walls. 
People grew increasingly sensible of difference – of the threats which it seemed to pose, but 
also of their own capacity to meet those perceived threats with violence. The earthly paradise 
was not for all, and if some were to be gathered in, others must needs be cast out. 
 The Catholic Church under its reforming popes led the way in separating sheep from 
goats, while also introducing into European life a new stress on the general, the total, the all-
encompassing. These same principles are also to be observed at work in the development of 
political communities of various kinds in the centuries after 1000 – among them the European 
kingdoms and the Christian peoples (gentes, nationes) to which it was widely believed these 
kingdoms gave constitutional form.
4
 Peoples claimed a central part in the political 
assumptions of medieval western Europeans – just as they did in the Bible, from which the 
political vocabulary of the Latin Middle Ages was to a large extent drawn.
5
 Medieval writers 
believed that humanity was fundamentally divided on ethnic lines. Its social building blocks 
were communities held together by ties of blood and shared origin, though also displaying 
common cultural attributes, ranging from language and law to elements such as dress, 
hairstyle, food, and manner of war. Common blood also took visible form in stature, physique 
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and skin colour. That the ethnic unities which medieval observers claimed to perceive were in 
fact cultural constructs hardly needs stating – but then, they always are. There seems no 
reason, therefore, to shrink from ascribing to medieval people fully-fledged notions of 
ethnicity (we might also say ‘race’) and – when these were linked to political titles – 
nationhood.
6
 For their articulation, medieval writers commanded a substantial and flexible 
terminology, in Latin and the vernacular tongues, and the manner in which they applied this is 
often strikingly close to modern usage. If it is also frequently vague, question-begging and 
contradictory, that, too, will scarcely surprise the student of modern nationalist discourse. The 
period after the first millennium is marked by the emergence in embryonic form of a Europe 
of sovereign ‘nation-states’ – political communities which combined claims to constitutional 
autonomy and territorial integrity with a population base conceived as ethnically 
homogeneous.
7
 By 1300 this process was, as we will see, entering a crucial and in some ways 
ominous phase. 
The world of Latin Europe in the central and late Middle Ages was an increasingly 
interconnected one, shaped by the development of communications channels and media more 
intensive and sophisticated than before. The size of surviving document archives and the 
number of known manuscript books show a marked increase for the centuries after the first 
millennium. To a heightened degree, this was a textual, a black-and-white world, in which 
words themselves became instruments of power – instruments which, with the expanding 
study of law, philosophy, and theology, literate Europeans were wielding with a new 
confidence, precision, and transformative effect. 
These various changes, in religion, politics and culture, were in their turn made 
possible by the transformation of economic life and social organisation in the centuries 
following the first millennium.
8
 Europe’s population rose steadily: on some estimates, 
between two- and threefold over-all between 1000 and the Black Death (1348-50). The 
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population of France may have grown from around five to perhaps fifteen million over the 
same period. All such figures carry a large margin of uncertainty. Not in doubt, however, are 
the consequences of demographic growth. Vast areas of land were cleared for agriculture to 
sustain the burgeoning population, forests were felled, marshes drained, and thousands of new 
villages established. Towns grew in size and number, proliferating across landscapes in which 
urban life was previously largely unknown. In Westphalia, east of the Rhine in northern 
Germany, only six towns were to be found before 1180: by 1350 there were 138 (though 
mostly small). Trade routes, bearing a swelling traffic of people, news and rumour, as well as 
goods, now linked towns to their rural hinterlands, and entire regions to each other, to the 
farthest ends of Europe, and to the world beyond. Money, unfamiliar to many at the 
millennium, became ubiquitous in the following centuries. And with its increased circulation 
came the powerful, disturbing responses that, underpinned by the Church’s teachings and 
sanctions, it evoked: fascination at its mysteriously transformative effect; and deep fear of that 
same evident power to change (and taint?) all that it touched. 
 By the late Middle Ages, Europe’s most economically advanced regions were 
heavily urbanised. In 1300, northern Italy boasted cities with populations in excess of 
100,000. By the same date, between fifteen and twenty per cent of English men and women 
were living in towns. In the fifteenth century, the urban element in the population of Flanders 
was over a third. Urban centres, and the values and mentalities which they nurtured, now 
offered a potent challenge to the landed, aristocratic order which had developed across 
medieval Europe – and a strong attraction to those rural peasantries whose landlords aspired 
to hold them in subjection. Tensions and conflicts between town and country, but also within 
the towns themselves, were heightened after the mid-fourteenth century by the sharp and 
protracted population fall which recurrent bouts of plague visited on much of Europe. Despite 
these changes, however, the human landscape across the continent was marked by sharp 
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regional contrasts. While late medieval Brabant (in the north-west, bordering Flanders) 
sustained around forty five inhabitants to every square kilometre, an equivalent space in the 
Polish bishopric of Poznań was still home to just two people. Europe’s margins long remained 
relatively empty – and continued to beckon incomers, of diverse status and of more and less 
pacific intent, from the more densely settled heartlands. 
 Medieval people thought genocidally. This was partly a consequence of their 
disposition radically to simplify their world, its past and imagined future, into a story of 
peoples. Because it was a dynamic story, in which some peoples rose and prospered, others 
necessarily fell, and even disappeared. Vanishing ‘like the Avars’ was a familiar enough 
motif for it to be applied proverbially by a twelfth-century Russian chronicler.
9
 And because 
earthly life in medieval accounts was filled with violence, the fall of peoples was also violent. 
Illustration of this view may be found in the numerous legendary accounts of the origins of 
European nations.
10
 Although a handful of these date from the early Middle Ages (and the 
origin of the genre itself is Roman), their number increases sharply from the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries. It was not invariably through violence that, in these legends, Europe’s 
peoples attained their medieval homelands; but bloodshed is a common enough motif to 
indicate a characteristic mode of thought. From Bavaria to Brittany and beyond, the forebears 
of medieval populations were repeatedly portrayed as immigrant warrior bands that had won 
their territories in a remote past by destroying or expelling the indigenous peoples whom they 
discovered upon arrival. The tale of the settlement of Britain, recounted by Geoffrey of 
Monmouth in the twelfth century and repeated and elaborated thereafter, has the Trojan 
émigré Brutus and his companions purging the rich isle of Albion of its aboriginal giants. In 
the settlement myth of the continental Saxons, the Thuringians were present in the Saxons’ 
land first and were removed, through a combination of killings and expulsions, to make way 
for the newcomers. The Scottish origin legend, as it is encountered in the early fourteenth 
 6 
century, has the ancient Scots occupying their homeland ‘having first driven out the Britons 
and altogether destroyed the Picts’.11 Thereafter, the victors commonly re-named the 
conquered land from their own leader or some reputed ancestor, in this way remaking its 
identity and obliterating what had gone before. In names were concentrated a people’s status, 
titles and claims, and therefore, in one important sense, its very existence. 
Such tales are revealing in a number of ways. For one thing, they reflect the earlier 
roots of medieval beliefs about the relations between different peoples. One of these was in 
the authority of Antiquity. The legend of Troy offered an example of how, through ethnic 
destruction and dispersal, new peoples might come into being. More pervasively, there was 
the template for ethnic history set out in the Old Testament. This precedent had a special 
importance in portraying the migration and settlement of one particular, divinely-favoured, 
people and the slaughter and eviction of others as according with God’s plan. It was therefore 
not only inevitable but right that some peoples should prevail and others face oblivion. The 
idea had already received famous and influential formulation by Bede in the eighth century, in 
his account of the triumph of the English over the native peoples of Britain
12
; but it was to 
attain new prominence and applicability after the millennium, in an age that emphasized in 
novel ways the organically Christian quality of political communities. Underlying all was a 
vision, inherited from the early Middle Ages and perpetuated through epic and heroic tales, of 
the feuding and mutual undoing of kindreds, clans and, by natural extension, peoples in 
obscure yet vividly evoked indigenous pasts. The aestheticisation of violence found in heroic 
literature, where the most elaborate metaphors were reserved for warriors, their weapons, and 
the harm they wrought, was to live on in a new and heightened ideological framework in the 
age of the crusades. 
It is no accident that legends recounting the settlement and overthrow of peoples 
proliferated in western Europe when they did. They belong to an age that brought a new 
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urgency and confidence to the tasks of explaining, labelling, classifying and distinguishing. 
Between the eleventh and the fourteenth centuries, a great deal of broadly ethnographic lore, 
on subjects ranging from the reputed origins of Islam to the nature and habitation of the fabled 
‘monstrous races’ of mankind, passed into circulation among literate Europeans: primarily, 
though not exclusively, members of the clergy.
13
 The revived interest in classical learning 
during the twelfth century both extended the quantity of knowledge available about the world 
and its peoples and enriched the conceptual vocabulary for their analysis. The fruits of these 
developments are evident in ethnographic writings such as those of Gerald of Wales in the 
late twelfth century on the Celtic peoples of the British Isles.
14
 The impulse to give account 
(though not necessarily seek understanding) of other peoples was quickened by the crusades 
against Turks and other Muslims and against the pagan peoples of northern Europe. The rise 
of the Mongols in the thirteenth century not only confronted westerners with the shock of a 
strange and terrifying ethnic Other but also, before long, opened up routes through Asia along 
which some Europeans were able to attain directly an expanded vision of a multifariously 
peopled world. 
 Because medieval people regarded ethnicity as an active and fundamental historical 
presence, they characteristically simplified and exaggerated, sometimes to the point of 
fictionality, its role in the events and developments with which they linked it. Genocidal 
thought therefore occupies a more substantial place in European history in this period than do 
genocidal acts, however broadly conceived. And medieval ideas of what constituted a 
people’s destruction were very broad. Writers seldom had in mind only systematic mass 
killing – though killing was nearly always, directly or indirectly, a part of their picture, and 
they were quite capable of imagining it being done systematically. In many cases, the actions 
which they invoked are more akin to modern notions of ethnic cleansing than the organised 
mass murder which some would now regard as the main object of the term genocide. These 
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actions, real or imagined, characteristically envisaged the forcible creation of ethnically 
homogeneous landscapes through processes involving various combinations of compulsory 
re-settlement, eviction, exile and actual slaughter. Often, however, they clearly meant by a 
people’s ‘extermination’ or ‘elimination’ – terms by no means rare in medieval writings – 
little more than its political disenfranchisement, the lopping-off (by means more or less 
bloody) of its native ruling elite, or the suppression of its means of common defence. Used 
rhetorically, the language of ethnic destruction might refer to developments in themselves no 
more violent than subjection to foreign rulers, the dominance of aliens at court, or the 
violation of alleged native privileges, customs or laws. None of this, however, should be 
interpreted as meaning that medieval people were not serious in using such language, or that 
its use need not be taken seriously by modern readers. To act in ways that  undermined a 
people’s standing within a competitive economy of peoples or (much the same thing) to 
threaten the continuation of its name was potentially to act genocidally. Such acts portended 
real and grave consequences. By stripping a people of the tangible lineaments of common 
being – indeed, of its historical and constitutional charters to be – they marked the start of a 
path which might well lead quickly to enslavement, murder and oblivion. This was not an 
unrealistic way of thinking; and the trajectory of destruction which it anticipates was indeed 
mapped out by more than one ethnic group in this period. 
It was not that medieval Europeans imagined the history of relations between different 
peoples only as violent, or thought that good could never come of their interaction. Some 
origin myths depict immigrant bands intermarrying with indigenous populations, thereby 
bringing forth offspring who represented a happy blending of the supposedly distinctive 
qualities of each people. A collection of maxims from twelfth-century Hungary contends that 
a multi-ethnic kingdom is stronger than one resting only upon a single language and law.
15
 
Characteristically, however, medieval writers’ judgements on the consequences of ethnic 
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mixing were less favourable. For the fourteenth-century chronicler Thomas Gray, the political 
fickleness of the English was a regrettable consequence of their being ‘a mixture of diverse 
nations’. The mutual enmity that seemed readily to arise when different peoples came 
together likewise argued for their being kept apart. Such antipathies appeared for some to 
have an inveterate quality. For the German chronicler Ekkehard, the coming-together of 
German and Frankish knights on the First Crusade only brought to light their ‘natural 
enmity’.16  
Ancient natural barriers between different European peoples were indeed being 
undermined, in a more mobile and interconnected age, of which the crusading movement is a 
prime manifestation. But this seems only to have encouraged in some quarters a heightened 
insistence on their naturalness and the need for their maintenance. The thirteenth-century 
chronicler and cartographer Matthew Paris, on a celebrated map of Britain, gave much 
prominence to the Hadrianic and Antonine walls, with labels denoting the peoples they had 
‘once’ kept apart. Other ethnic barriers, meanwhile, had a more urgent and continuing 
relevance. High-medieval world maps (mappae mundi) took pains to depict the great wall 
which it was believed Alexander the Great had built in the Caucasus, to pen up the 
cannibalistic peoples of Gog and Magog.
17
 Heroic and salutary feats of ethnic engineering 
were for medieval observers a hallmark of the great ruler. Yet the prophetic scheme of 
Christian history also disclosed to them that such barriers would not stand for ever, for it was 
necessary that the genocidal scourge of the ‘unclean peoples’ at some time be unleashed upon 
Christendom.  
 
RULERS, TERRITORIES, AND THE CHANGING MAP OF PEOPLES 
The ethnographic turn and the quest for common origins were impelled by shifts in the 
political map involving both the formation of political communities within Europe and the 
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dealings of European powers with their neighbours in a wider world. In this climate, origin 
legends had an importance beyond mere antiquarianism. They were claims to power and 
constitutional independence: manifestos, in short, for ethno-political survival where this 
seemed imperilled. In an age of political expansion and consolidation, there were some who 
found in the brutally dog-eat-dog world that they evoked, where the genocidally ruthless 
prevailed, tracts for their own times. The Scottish origin myth was recounted in response to 
English pretensions, in the age of Edward I (1272-1307), to suppress and swallow up the 
hitherto-distinct kingdom of Scots. An imaginative vision of the actual fate of those who went 
down before the onset of conquering kings was unfolded early in the thirteenth century by 
Gervase of Tilbury, an Englishman writing for the German emperor Otto IV. Gervase told of 
how Henry II (1154-89) had intervened in Ireland, reordering social relations there, ‘though 
not without the shedding of much blood of English and Britons’. A new civilisation had 
thereby dawned in the island, ‘once the foul Irish race had been expelled’.18 In Scotland, too, 
‘a succession of holy kings’ had introduced beneficial changes, but only after ‘the Scots, men 
of a foul way of life’ were driven out. Of course, no such mass expulsion had occurred in 
either land. Yet, mistaken as they are, Gervase’s claims are highly significant, indicating how 
developments even in the very recent past might be understood – or rather, radically 
misunderstood – in terms of the self-same model of violent ethnic replacement that is found in 
the origin myths. Socio-political re-ordering meant also a new ethnic order. Re-shaking the 
kaleidoscope of peoples, moreover, pertained especially to kings. 
 Far-reaching developments were indeed afoot; and at Europe’s expanding high-
medieval margins these took on a particular character. If contemporaries simplified the role of 
ethnicity within them and exaggerated its importance and consequences, their reactions 
nevertheless illuminate the experience of social and political change for those caught up in it 
– and the material responses that, for some, those changed facts of life seemed to invite. 
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Between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries, population growth, migration, and the 
transplantation to Europe’s frontier zones of legal systems, technologies, and social and 
political institutions previously developed at its western continental core enabled the 
establishment of societies which some historians have termed colonial.
19
 At Europe’s western 
and eastern extremities, incoming warrior elites founded their dominance over indigenous 
communities both upon new, overmastering technologies of violence (notably those 
associated with the armoured heavy cavalryman) and upon self-justifying doctrines of cultural 
superiority. New power relationships were therefore bound up with changed relations between 
peoples and cultures – though the interconnections were in reality more complex and varied 
than the remarks of medieval writers mostly allow us to suspect. Nevertheless, the expansion 
of certain peoples was indeed in some respects at the expense of others. And it accorded with 
their familiar habits of thought when contemporary and later observers diagnosed a harsh fate 
for the losers. Such commentators were not always remote or ignorant. Helmold of Bosau (d. 
after 1177), who chronicled the conversion of the Baltic Slavs and the settlement of Germans 
and Flemings in their lands could scarcely have been better informed. Himself a priest at work 
on the Slav-German frontier when the movement was at its height, he knew personally many 
of the main participants. For Helmold too, immigration and social change inevitably meant 
ethnic replacement: 
 
Now … because God gave plentiful aid and victory to [Henry the Lion, duke of 
Saxony] and to the other princes, the Slavs have been everywhere crushed and driven 
out. A people strong and without number have come from the bounds of the ocean, 
and taken possession of the territories of the Slavs. They have built cities and churches 
and have grown in riches beyond all estimation.
20
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Helmold’s account of his times is not (here in contrast to Gervase of Tilbury’s) fundamentally 
wrong: not only was the ethnic composition of his region changing: coercion and, at least 
locally, forced displacements were indeed part of the story. But in its bald ethnic essentialism 
it is certainly misleading. Nevertheless, it was the first draft of a history that would harden to 
orthodoxy in the years that followed. In the fifteenth century, the Church reformer and 
historiographer Dietrich of Niem, himself a native Saxon, would shift part of the by-then 
mythologized story further back in time. For Dietrich, the Frankish conqueror Charlemagne 
(768-814) had already destroyed and expelled the Slavs from lower Saxony, ‘apart from a 
handful, who down to the present day dwell in certain rural hamlets, mostly in marshy places, 
though under perpetual servitude to the Saxons’.21 
 Yet nothing was fixed for ever. Since all medieval peoples tended in their own 
estimations to rate as doughty warriors, there was no re-making of the ethnic map that might 
not in its turn be undone by some heroic future act of collective violence. As early as the ninth 
century, the History of the Britons (perhaps wrongly) associated with the name of Nennius 
was holding out the prophetic hope that the red British serpent would chase from the island 
the white of the Saxon interloper. The same hope was still alive at the end of the twelfth 
when, according to Gerald of Wales, the Welsh were drawing from the prophecies of Merlin 
the expectation ‘that both the nation (natio) and name of the [English] foreigners shall be 
expunged’ from their land.22 Those who moved between the lines on Europe’s colonial 
frontiers could turn to their advantage the hopes and fears of both camps. As a fourteenth-
century Irish poet explained to the first earl of Desmond: 
 
In the [English] foreigners’ poems we promise that the Irish shall be driven from 
Ireland; in the Irishmen’s poems we promise that the foreigner shall be routed across 
the sea.
23
 
 13 
 
By the troubled fifteenth century, such fears, resting on wildly mythologized recollections of 
high-medieval migrations and ethno-demographic shifts of the kind we have glimpsed 
already, might become a basis for explicit agitation. A manifesto of the Czech Hussites (1420) 
rallied its audience to arms against their German neighbours with a warning that ‘just as they 
did to our tongue on the Rhine, in Misnia, in Prussia, and drove it out, the same they intend to 
do to us and to occupy the places of the banished’.24 
 
The two or three centuries which follow the millennium can accurately be called an age of 
kings. The number of European kingdoms itself grew substantially as also did the capabilities 
of royal government and the claims advanced in the names of rulers and peoples. The empire-
building pretensions of kings, and of quasi-regal figures like Henry the Lion of Saxony (d. 
1195), lay at the heart of many of those premonitions and allegations of violent ethnic change 
which recur in writings from the time. The medieval habit of mapping ethnicity onto 
constitutional formations meant not only the emergence of new ‘peoples’ within new realms 
but also, in a climate of political and dynastic flux, the spectre of obliteration for others. The 
viewpoint which conceived of political revolution as ethnic destruction was given classic 
formulation by the chronicler Henry of Huntingdon, for whom the Norman conquest of 
England was an implementation of God’s judgement on the sinful English, namely that they 
should cease to exist as a people. In twelfth-century imagination, a people’s undoing did not 
need to involve mass killing. It might do, however: another chronicler, Orderic Vitalis, tells of 
a plot which came to the notice of King Stephen ‘to kill all the Normans on a fixed day and 
hand the government of the kingdom over to the Scots’.25 Not all were prepared to accept 
divine judgement as binding or view the settlement of 1066 as irreversible: inter-ethnic 
violence might write its own, new histories. 
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 At Europe’s margins, changing topographies of peoplehood and power came together 
with the expanding resources, claims and possibilities of kingship. By the thirteenth century, 
rulers of the more highly-developed kingdoms were possessed of both the means and the will 
to reorder in some detail the ethnic landscapes of their realms. Between the 1220s and 1240s, 
Frederick II of Hohenstaufen (d. 1250) relocated the entire Muslim population of his Sicilian 
kingdom – perhaps numbering between 15,000 and 30,000 people – to the mainland town of 
Lucera. We have not yet quite heard the last of the Muslims of Lucera. A more modest 
example of ethno-social engineering illuminates what the king stood to gain. In 1295, Edward 
I founded an English settler-borough beside his castle at Beaumaris, deep in newly-conquered 
Wales. The population of a native township on the site was forcibly resettled twelve miles 
away. The pattern was repeated elsewhere in Wales around the same time, amounting to a not 
insignificant re-shaking of the pattern of peoples there.
26
 Economic advantage, defence and 
security, and the visible display of dominance by a quasi-imperial conqueror might all alike 
recommend a royal policy of local ethnic displacement. 
 When the king’s actions benefited his peers and native-born followers, all might be 
well. But matters were not always so simple and the position of kings themselves in relation 
to the settlement movements of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries could prove troublingly 
ambivalent. On the one hand, it had been customary since the earliest times for rulers to draw 
useful or prestigious foreigners to their realms and courts – a practice whose extension the 
economic opportunities of the age strongly favoured. On the other, the idea of kings as fathers 
to their (ideally, ethnically cohesive) peoples was at this time finding increasingly powerful 
expression. There was nothing new about foreign favourites at court drawing the resentment 
of native elites; but now, in European frontier regions, those high-status interlopers were just 
one element within a larger, socially-diverse immigration process. In this climate, alien 
courtiers seemed in the eyes of some to be malevolent harbingers of a radically new ethnic 
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order. A Polish chronicler of the early fourteenth century believed that Germans brought in to 
advise the young princes of Głogów had incited them ‘to exterminate the entire Polish nation, 
both clergy and laity, and especially the knights’.27 Such fancies took wing the more readily 
when a ruler harnessed aliens to local development projects like Edward I’s in Wales. Certain 
kings of Bohemia earned a dark name among the Czech-speaking political classes for using 
Germans in this way. Přemysl Otakar II (1253-78) had resettled with Germans the suburb 
beneath Prague castle, at the myth-laden heart of his realm, on one account by expelling the 
native residents. Within little more than a generation of his death, indigenous myth-making 
had turned the king’s unpatriotic act into a full-scale plan to hand his kingdom over to the 
Germans. In the febrile atmosphere of the Hussite agitations of the fifteenth century, the same 
and worse was being reported of the cosmopolitian Charles IV of Luxembourg (1347-78). 
Charles had ‘thought to settle the Czech land with the German race, of which he himself 
came, and gradually root out the Czechs from it’.28 
 Such spectres drew substance both from an awareness of what kings were by the late 
Middle Ages capable of doing and from some strikingly ethnocentric ideas about what they 
might and should do. In the more governmentally-sophisticated realms, such perceptions and 
assumptions came together relatively early. A twelfth-century estimation of the powers (and 
intentions) of the English monarchy is glimpsed in Henry of Huntingdon’s depiction of the St 
Brice’s Day massacre of 1002, in which, according to the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, ‘all the 
Danish men in England’ had been killed at the behest of King Æthelred II.29 The sparseness 
of contemporary evidence makes this instance of genocide by royal command hard to judge; 
but historians have argued for its likely modest extent. Henry, however, presents it as a co-
ordinated act of government, underpinned by the systematic dispatch of royal letters to every 
town in the realm. His picture, while unlikely to be accurate, was certainly prophetic, and by 
the end of the thirteenth century some royal bureaucracies were capable of targeting 
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unpopular or controversial groups with police actions of chilling scope and suddenness. ‘You 
have achieved in one day what the Pharaohs of ancient Egypt failed to do’, was one 
chronicler’s response to Edward I’s expulsion of the Jews from England. For the poet 
Geoffrey of Paris, the actions instituted by Philip IV of France (1285-1313) against Jews, 
Templars and others merged into a single vision of royal purge: ‘Jews, Templars and 
Christians / Were caught and put in bonds, / And driven from one country to another’.30 The 
Capetian imitators of Christ were cleansing the regnal Temple with a whip. 
 
The late medieval wars that those formidable royal bureaucracies came to sustain led some to 
perceive in the kingdoms of Europe, however unrealistically, instruments of organised mass 
violence portending the outright ethnic obliteration of their neighbours. Edward I’s celebrated 
claim of 1295, that the French king was preparing an invasion in order to ‘delete’ the English 
tongue, was to be the first of several such pieces of rhetorical scaremongering set down in the 
name of late medieval English kings.
31
 In France, where some regions suffered the protracted 
ravages of war, the late medieval vision of destruction attained Biblical proportions: a late 
fourteenth-century tapestry portrays the English kings as crowned and mounted Apocalyptic 
locusts, emerging from the bottomless pit to devour the land (Revelation 9: 1-11).
32
 As will 
shortly become clear, the totality of this vision of destruction was characteristic of an 
important strand in medieval ethno-religious thought, as was also its polarising quality, pitting 
holy kings and chosen peoples against personified evil – dehumanised, bestial and unclean. 
 The notes of extremism, and the harnessing to violent acts of a violently ethnocentric 
rhetoric, also infused other elements of late medieval life. The richness and the character of 
the surviving sources may admittedly make the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries appear to us 
more distinct from what had gone before than they actually were. It is clear, however, that 
reports and predictions of large-scale bloodshed were also underlain by new currents and 
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tensions in social and religious life. The prospect of organised mass killing was periodically 
in the air in various contexts, not always related to ethnicity. Some radical religious groups 
believed a general slaughter of the clergy to be imminent, while both lords and peasant 
communities in various parts of Europe confronted from time to time the seemingly 
impending prospect of fundamental and bloody social upheaval. Where members of different 
ethnic groups were involved, movements and conflicts with complex origins were easily seen 
as struggles between implacable rival peoples. Such perceptions came to the fore especially in 
the towns, whose spectacular growth in number and size across much of Europe was one of 
the most enduring legacies of the post-millennium period. Towns, with their complex and 
periodically acute social tensions and power rivalries, penned up natives and aliens together in 
closely confined spaces under circumstances apt to render the outsider both visible and 
vulnerable.  
 The hothouse urban environment encouraged the invocation of ethnic divisions to 
explain conflicts stemming in part from other discontents: economic, political, devotional, 
local or even professional. Alien university masters and students might be forced out, as 
several hundred Germans were from Prague in 1409. Foreign garrisons were massacred – as 
in Palermo in 1282 or Bruges in 1302.
33
 In various parts of Europe, barriers were now being 
raised, with towns making it harder for foreigners to settle or practice crafts, or excluding 
them altogether. Bouts of economic hardship and political instability were liable to be 
attended by outbreaks of violence against resident foreign merchants, seamen or artisans. 
Occasionally, these attained major proportions and left substantial numbers dead, as did the 
attacks on ‘Flemings’ in the south and east of England in 1381.34 The ‘great rising’ in June of 
that year was a response to the perceived corruption and incapacity of English royal 
government, particularly in its handling of the war with France. Its background, however, lay 
in the disintegration of social hierarchies and the legal relationships that underpinned them in 
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the circumstances of sharp demographic downturn, falling rents, and rising labour costs which 
followed the Black Death. The anti-alien violence which accompanied the rising, particularly 
the killing of many foreign artisans and merchants in London, illustrates clearly how urban 
spaces might act to draw social and political discontents to a focus in inter-ethnic bloodshed. 
Often, admittedly, such late medieval bloodshed was the outcome of mere riots or 
drunken brawls. Increasingly, however, if contemporary reports are to be believed, the voice 
of the people was to be heard on such occasions, clamouring for a general destruction of the 
foreigner. ‘Death to the French!’ ‘Kill all Flemings!’ Those same reports tell also of the 
homely watchwords that conspirators coined to affirm their solidarity and to tongue-tie and 
expose the alien in their midst. Without question, our sources commonly exaggerate the 
destructiveness of such disorders and simplify the role of ethnicity in them; but this 
exaggeration itself reveals much about contemporary moods. And where popular disturbances 
attracted more than local support, modest revisions to the ethnic map bequeathed by high-
medieval migration might indeed result. The revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr in early fifteenth-
century Wales induced some inhabitants of the English boroughs to take flight for England. 
Local ethnic displacement was more substantial where social and political tensions were 
combined with religion, as they were in fifteenth-century Bohemia, resulting in the purging of 
German communities from a number of towns, including the capital.
35
  
By this time, contending political and social groups were able to hurl at each other 
stereotyped vocabularies of ethnocentric abuse of much radicalism and menace. Compiling 
lists of the supposed good and (particularly) bad qualities of different peoples was nothing 
new: as a literary exercise it went back to Antiquity. The classification of peoples began, 
however, to shed its dry school-book quality during the twelfth century, in context of a 
broader interest among educated Europeans in the nature of humanity, coupled with a revived 
application of Antique notions of the barbarian.
36
 These developments were taking place at a 
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time when colonisation and state-building were lending such cultural pursuits a keen political 
edge, and developments in the Church underpinning them with a new facility in judging and 
condemning. Against this background, certain peoples – particularly those which found 
themselves locked in violent competition with their neighbours – came to be subjected to 
negative portrayals more eloquent and absolute than before, backed by a new doctrinal 
authority, and bearing an underlying call to destruction. Definitions of humanity emphasising 
reason, cultivation and order were deployed to portray enemies and subject populations as less 
than fully human. The Irish, in English accounts, were ‘wild’, the Scots ‘bestial men’. The 
Germans were ‘dog-heads’ – semi-humans, evoking the monstrous beings supposed to inhabit 
the earth’s arid margins. The lives of such ones were surely cheaper than those of the fully 
human. The English in fourteenth-century Ireland were accused of saying that it was no more 
a sin to kill an Irishman than a dog.
37
 To monstrosity and sub-humanity were added 
associations of filth, pollution, and parasitism. The Czechs were a ‘putrid odour’ to the 
Bohemian king Sigismund (1419-37), while for a fourteenth-century Czech pamphleteer their 
German rivals were ‘wolves in the fold, flies on the food, serpents in the bosom, harlots in the 
house’.38 
 That a land should be cleansed of such pollutants appeared axiomatic; and a 
luxuriating imagery of weeds and vermin indicated not only problems, but solutions. ‘When 
[the Irish] fall into your hands pluck them all up by the root, as the good gardener doth the 
nettle’, urged a fourteenth-century Dublin notary.39 Talk of beasts – the Irish as hares, for 
example – led on naturally to talk of hunting. The task could seem the more urgent since 
beastliness and hybridity were no neutral states. Monsters (as their supposed Latin cognates, 
monstro, moneo, made clear) were signs and warnings: they spoke of sin. For Gerald of 
Wales, it was the propensity of the Irish for bestial, incestuous and other illicit sex that 
explained the proliferation of malformed people in their land. But to some, the image of their 
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neighbours spoke of things beyond sin: active malevolence, imminent danger. The vocabulary 
of inter-ethnic defamation thus merged at its extreme end with one of absolute evil. Heretics 
were also routinely compared to parasites; the encroaching Mongols too were a monster-
people, their wickedness encoded in misshapen bodies. Bohemia’s Germans were for one 
Czech author an ‘accursed tribe’, as utterly outside the fold as Muslims or Jews.40 To speak in 
this way of wayward and unclean races was to invoke an Old-Testament template – one that 
pointed towards the extirpation of the wicked by the chosen under their divinely-blessed 
leaders.
41
 
 
PEOPLES ACCURSED OF GOD: VIOLENCE AND THE CHRISTIAN FRONTIER 
It was when the language of ethnic distinction became overlaid with that of divine favour and 
disfavour that fantasies of the destruction of peoples most often found a measure of material 
fulfilment. The Reform movement in the eleventh-century Church offered western Europeans 
not only the vision of a purified Christian community and distinct criteria for inclusion and 
exclusion, but a strong imperative to act for its creation. And action was from the outset 
conceived in part as a cleansing struggle between peoples. A chronicle account of Pope Urban 
II’s speech of 1095 inaugurating the First Crusade has him appeal to the Franks as a people 
divinely chosen. The Muslim occupiers of the Holy Places, on the other hand, were ‘an 
accursed race, a race utterly alienated from God’.42 While the mass slaughter of Muslims was 
not a specific aim of the crusaders, a degree of territorial purification was. Not only Muslims 
and Jews, but all who were not Latin Christians were initially purged from Jerusalem 
following the city’s fall in 1099 and forbidden to dwell there. While some native Christians 
were subsequently re-admitted, the bar to Jews and Muslims remained. And if outright mass 
killing proved to be but a partial and temporary phenomenon, it certainly occurred. Not only 
were many of Jerusalem’s Muslims and Jews put to the sword when the city fell; large-scale 
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slaughter of non-Christians continued in other Palestinian cities upon their capture by the 
Latins throughout the first decade of the twelfth century. Moreover, in a manner which was to 
be characteristic of crusading warfare, western commentators celebrated the killing of non-
Christians, and talked up the body count. When Jerusalem fell, men rode through blood up to 
their knees and the bridle bits of their horses. ‘Has anyone ever seen or heard of such a 
slaughter of the infidel race?’, wondered one chronicler. ‘God alone knows the number for no 
one else does.’43 
 The same large and general acts, the same absolute distinctions between damned and 
saved, were transferable to other Christian frontiers. Henry of Livonia tells how in 1227 ‘all 
the people of both sexes’ were baptised on Ösel (Saaremaa) in the Gulf of Riga, following the 
island’s conquest by a crusading army. The Christian priests ‘watered the nations by the font, 
and their faces with tears’. It was not to last. Another chronicler explains how in 1260 the 
island’s inhabitants ‘broke away and left not a single Christian alive in all their territories’. 
‘Later’, he adds, ‘many of them were destroyed for doing this’.44 Bloodshed followed quickly 
on the watering of the gentiles – and each was conceived as a general act. The manner of 
thought was characteristic; so too the scale of violence. ‘Kill them all; Truly, God will know 
his own!’ The words, attributed to a papal legate at the massacre of the population of Béziers 
(1209) during the Albigensian crusade, may never have been uttered; but the writer who set 
them down just a few years afterwards captured the spirit of time and context.
45
 Crusaders 
shed blood with hopeful hearts and easy consciences, and the chivalric norms which were 
curbing some of the extremities of war at Europe’s core counted for much less on a religious 
frontier. The population in some parts of Prussia may have fallen for a time by between 
twenty and fifty per cent during the Teutonic Order’s destructive conquest – part holy war, 
part strategic land-grab – in the thirteenth century.46 Crusading doctrine, to its proponents, 
stiffened the soldier’s will against pragmatism and backsliding. It made of him also an ethnic 
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warrior. St Bernard of Clairvaux sought to rouse up the German nobility for a crusade against 
the Baltic Slavs with the injunction that they should ‘take vengeance on the [pagan] peoples 
and exterminate them from the land of our Christian name’. There was to be no peace ‘until, 
with God’s aid, either the [heathen] rite itself or the population [natio] has been destroyed’.47 
 The resulting expedition – the ‘Wendish Crusade’ of 1147 – predictably took a 
different and far more limited course than that urged by the zealot Bernard. Nevertheless, his 
conception of the crusade as a radical contest of peoples is affirmed by others. Helmold of 
Bosau writes as often of Slavs and Saxons as he does of pagans and Christians. Most religious 
frontiers were also cultural and ethnic ones, and religion itself readily conceived as an 
attribute of peoplehood, reflecting shared character and identity. A story survives of how a 
group of Livonians in the late twelfth century decided to wash off their recent baptism with 
the waters of the River Dvina and thus send their Christianity back to the land of the Saxons, 
whence it came. It was not therefore only for Bernard that religious non-conformity dictated 
ethnic destruction. It was as a race of heretics that, for the German Dominican Johann 
Falkenberg (writing c.1412), all Poles merited extermination.
48
 The doctrines of Church 
reformers and crusade preachers were by the late Middle Ages furnishing western Europeans 
with a powerful conception of Christian community, within which the presence of alien 
groups looked increasingly unacceptable. 
 The power of this doctrine to re-shape the ethnic landscape became particularly 
apparent with its growing assimilation to the political sphere. By the thirteenth century, 
princes and their learned apologists were increasingly harnessing invocations of sacred 
community to notions of shared political allegiance and legal doctrines exalting the power of 
monarchs within their consolidating realms. Their exclusionary potential was realised earliest 
on the frontier. The fall of Seville to the king of Castile in 1248 was followed by the 
wholesale expulsion of its Muslim population. In thinly populated frontier zones, such 
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changes were apt to prove only temporary. At Europe’s core, however, they would be more 
secure. The last crusader strongholds in the Latin East fell in 1291; but at exactly that time 
rulers were acting with a new resolve to build their own purified Christian holy lands on 
European soil. It marked a significant new departure when the entire Muslim population of 
Minorca was enslaved following the island’s fall to the Aragonese in 1287. In 1300, the 
deeply devout Charles II of Naples (nephew of one royal saint and father to another) sold into 
slavery the Muslims of Lucera. The city was henceforth to be a Christian space, protected by 
the Virgin Mary.
49
 The Promised Land had come home; but this only served to highlight the 
obligation upon those (Christian) Israelites to whom it rightly belonged to destroy the unclean 
Canaanite peoples whose presence still befouled it. 
 
THE TEMPLE AND THE WHIP: THE JEWS IN A CHRISTIAN EUROPE 
A thirteenth-century mappa mundi portrays the figure of Christ as physically merged with a 
created and peopled world.
50
 The centuries after the first millennium saw Christ drawn closer 
to humanity, which in turn became conceivable as a Christian body – or, politically, as a 
community of Christian peoples under their kings. Christ’s body and blood lent legitimacy 
and affirmed common bonds; but they also became an increasingly extensive charter for 
shedding the blood of those not of that body (-politic). The communities of Jews, which by 
the eleventh century were already numerous and widely-scattered through Europe, would in 
the period that followed become the object of the most virulently genocidal rhetoric and the 
most extensive and radical violence to be suffered by any European ethnic group. And yet, 
unique thought these were in scope, intensity and consequences, they also resemble in certain 
ways the patterns of abuse and coercion that we have discovered underlying other medieval 
inter-ethnic conflicts. Latin Christians wrote about Jews in a (highly abusive) language of 
race. For Peter the Venerable (d. 1156) they were a ‘wretched people’. The chronicler Guibert 
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of Nogent portrays crusaders in 1096 wondering why they were making an arduous journey to 
the East when ‘the Jews, of all races the worst foes of God, are before our eyes’.51 Jews 
became the subject of a repertoire of defamatory stereotypes that mirrored and extended those 
which Christian peoples applied to each other. Jews too were likened to vermin. They were 
less than fully human, assimilated by physiognomy (as also were Muslims) to the ‘monstrous 
races’; they were associated with demons and with the baser animals: in bestiaries, the hyena 
was a Jew-prototype. Jews acted as a community – to Christian polemicists, an encompassing, 
malevolent and conspiratorial community. As a people, they were linked by blood to other 
accursed races: for Matthew Paris, the Mongols were the ten Lost Tribes, whose destructive 
onset was in concert with their kinsmen within Christendom.
52
 
 They came, moreover, increasingly to be associated, by a variety of commentators, 
with general schemes of pollution and violence, inviting in turn violent general responses. In 
1321, wild rumours associated the Jews of Languedoc in a well-poisoning conspiracy with 
lepers (who wished all people to be leprous) and with outside Muslim powers.
53
 With the 
high-medieval humanisation of the figure of Christ and the Christianisation of human 
communities went a growing tendency to depict Jews as not only deicidal but genocidal. 
Their supposed practice of mistreating consecrated communion hosts was not only a re-
enactment of the crucifixion on Christ’s miraculous body; it was an attack on the unity of 
Christ and his people.  
There were still some within Christian Europe who came to the Jews’ defence: 
distinguished churchmen, popes among them, who reiterated the traditional defence of the 
Jews’ presence in Christendom as divinely-willed and spoke against the wilder anti-Judaic 
fantasies. Over time, however, their arguments proved less and less able to prevail against 
rival currents, also drawing on Christian justifications, which urged the Jews’ exclusion or 
destruction. It was from fear of their ‘extermination’, explained Pope Innocent IV in 1247, 
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that Jews in Germany had sought his aid.
54
 The fear was by this date an increasingly realistic 
one. 
 The earliest major attacks on Jewish communities in Europe had been during the First 
Crusade, and subsequent expeditions were also attended by localised bouts of bloodletting. 
However, it was from the later thirteenth century that anti-Jewish violence in Europe took on 
new proportions. It is estimated that several thousand may have perished in the agitations that 
convulsed parts of Germany in 1298, inspired by host-desecration charges. However, 
bloodshed of a quite new extent and thoroughness was attained in the massacres which 
heralded the arrival of the Black Death in central Europe during the years 1348-50. In town 
after town, well-poisoning rumours became a pretext for the systematic killing of entire 
Jewish communities. Nearly a thousand may have died in the German town of Erfurt alone. In 
some places – Basel, Strasbourg, Constance – the Jews were forced into specially-constructed 
houses to be burned. A contemporary chronicler claimed that it took six days to burn 
Strasbourg’s Jews on account of their number. ‘And I could believe’, he mused, ‘that the end 
of the Hebrews had come’.55  
Elsewhere in Europe, princes had already by this date taken steps of their own to 
reaffirm the Christian character of their realms, by means of the mass expulsion of their 
Jewish populations. Whereas Church reformers and heretics had pursued their rival visions of 
a purged and purified Christian heaven on earth, Catholic monarchs now laid more limited 
plans for building ‘heaven in one country’. England’s Jews were forced out by Edward I in 
1290. The Jews of France, who had suffered temporary expulsions and other oppressions 
under previous kings, were systematically driven from the realm by Philip IV in 1306. As 
many as 100,000 people may have been compelled to leave.
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 The pattern was repeated in 
other late medieval realms, down to the mass expulsion of the large Jewish populations of the 
Iberian kingdoms at the end of the fifteenth century. In part, princes now acted in this way 
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because, as we have seen, they had attained the governmental means to do so. More 
importantly, however, some rulers had come by this time to view the purification of their 
realms as a sacred duty. There was henceforth to be just one – organically Christian – Chosen 
People, rightfully occupying the holy soil of its own sovereign kingdom under its rightful and 
anointed king. Read as a constitutional text, the Bible itself had come to represent, for the 
peoples of medieval Europe and for their rulers, the most powerful, and fatally empowering, 
collective origin myth of all. 
 
RULED OUT: EXCLUSIONARY IMPULSES AND THE MAKING OF EUROPE 
The existence of peoples in Europe in the central and later Middle Ages reflected the facts of 
power: for contemporaries, ethnic communities were axiomatically political ones. To imperil 
a people’s political status, as embodied in its privileges, laws, common institutions, in the 
power of its members to act politically, and more numinously in their sense of shared prestige 
and distinctiveness within a world of peoples, was to act genocidally. In a period that saw 
extensive changes to the European political map, the spectre of such acts never seemed far 
remote. Where the interactions of different peoples were most intensive, stress-laden, and 
ideologically- and politically-charged – on the frontier, at the courts of princes, or in the great 
towns – acts of ethnic destruction were anticipated, and in some quarters sought, most keenly. 
Medieval people were prone to simplify and exaggerate the role of ethnicity in the conflicts of 
their day. Consequently, the destruction of peoples – even in their own broad understanding 
of that phenomenon – did not occur nearly as often as they expected. In spite of this, their 
diagnosis of its causality and likely course was fundamentally correct. When entire 
populations were indeed subjected to systematic violence, enslavement or eviction, those acts 
were usually preceded – often over a protracted period – by other seemingly lesser ones, 
which served to strip the group of its political and legal independence: its autonomous right to 
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be. ‘The king’s Jews’ necessarily waited on the king’s will; and his will was by the late 
Middle Ages taking, across much of Europe, an increasingly ethnocentric turn. 
 The pattern was not bound to be repeated everywhere, of course. Political and legal 
marginalisation did not have to lead to collective oblivion: it did not do so, for example, in 
late medieval Ireland or post-conquest Wales. Outright ethnic destruction was most likely to 
occur where political subjugation was reinforced by fundamental religious difference. Pagans, 
Muslims, and Jews, but also, in an age of sharpened conceptions of religious orthodoxy, 
adherents of (for their opponents) false forms of Christianity, were singled out for extreme 
solutions. For the rest, the history of this long period is partly one of how, through more 
intensive and precisely-defined interactions, different imagined ethnic groups evolved forms 
of coexistence and mutual accommodation. Nevertheless, Europeans were also by the end of 
the Middle Ages more practised and accomplished ethnic discriminators and excluders, in 
thought and deed, than they had been in earlier times. Their world was one of more sharply-
defined and cohesive communities, in which the alien was more conspicuous, more readily 
and vehemently named, and less easily accommodated: a world that sought unities and was 
keenly sensible of the problems of coping with multiplicity. Their power fundamentally to 
rule out, and conviction that such ruling-out was needful, ultimately derived in large part from 
those same currents of social change, religious reform and intellectual renewal which had also 
provided a foundation for the period’s most startling cultural achievements and advances – as 
some would say, for European civilisation itself.  
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